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Implementing the National Flood Insurance Reform Act in a New Era of
Catastrophes
Summary
The United States has entered a new era of catastrophes, of which floods have been the most devastating.
Through its 2012 reform (Biggert-Waters Act), the 45-year old federally-run National Flood Insurance
Program has an opportunity to highlight the role that risk-based premiums can play in encouraging
individuals to undertake loss reduction measures. But the implementation of this reform is now being
challenged due to concerns that residents cannot afford risk-based premiums. The authors of this brief
propose that this can be overcome by successfully combining risk-based pricing, required insurance, means-
tested insurance vouchers, and mitigation loans, so that individuals reduce their flood risk and are financially
protected against future disaster losses, thus reducing the need for taxpayer money for disaster relief in the
future.
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Many communities in the U.S. have suf-
fered recently from a series of disasters that 
have caused extensive damage and have 
been extremely costly. Following these 
catastrophes, insurance payments were 
historically high, as was the relief provided 
by the national government to state and 
municipal governments in affected areas.1 
The 2005 and 2012 hurricane seasons 
taken together cost taxpayers nearly 
$150 billion—about a third of which was 
from losses due to Hurricane Sandy that 
occurred a year ago this October. These 
facts raise two broad questions for the 
nation to consider: 
What steps can be taken to reduce damage 
from future disasters so that communities are 
more resilient with respect to these events? 
Who should pay for mitigating losses from 
future disasters and the economic impacts trig-
gered by these catastrophes? 
Answering these questions is now 
urgent. The empirical and scientific 
evidence on the increased losses from 
natural catastrophes and more extreme 
weather trends suggests that the worst is 
yet to come. The National Flood Insurance 
Reform Act (NFIRA) of 2012 (also known 
as the Biggert-Waters Act), passed three 
months before Hurricane Sandy, offers an 
opportunity to address how we can reduce 
future losses while providing better financial 
protection to disaster victims. But there are 
challenges in getting individuals to volun-
tarily purchase insurance coverage before a 
disaster. And affordability issues, which are 
now part of a national public policy debate, 
threaten to delay the implementation of key 
features of this legislation.2 This Issue Brief 
addresses the important role that NFIRA 
can play in establishing a financially sound 
system for disaster insurance, and proposes 
concrete ways to overcome the challenges to 
its prompt implementation. 
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a new era oF 
catastrophes
Worldwide, economic losses from natural 
catastrophes increased from $528 billion 
in the decade 1981-1990, to $1,197 billion 
during 1991-2000, and $1,213 billion dur-
ing 2001-2010. In 2011 alone, economic 
losses amounted to over $400 billion, in 
large part due to the March 2011 Japan 
earthquake and resulting tsunami; 2012 
brought another $170 billion in economic 
losses.3 Turning closer to home, Hurricane 
Katrina led to economic losses in the range 
of $150 to $200 billion—an historic record 
in the United States for a natural disaster. 
Hurricane Sandy caused an estimated $68 
billion in direct economic losses to resi-
dences, business owners, and infrastructure 
owners in the continental U.S.4 It is the 
second most costly natural disaster in the 
United States after Hurricane Katrina.
Insured losses have dramatically 
increased as well. Between 1970 and the 
mid-1980s, annual insured losses from 
natural disasters worldwide (including forest 
fires) were only in the $3 billion to $4 billion 
range. Hurricane Hugo, which made landfall 
in Charleston, South Carolina, on Septem-
ber 22, 1989, was the first natural disaster 
in the United States to inflict more than $1 
billion of insured losses, with insured losses 
of $4.2 billion (1989 prices). During the 
period 2001 to 2010, insured losses from 
weather-related disasters alone averaged $30 
billion annually.5 A radical change! 
Table 1 ranks the 25 most costly insured 
catastrophes that occurred from 1970-2012. 
With the exception of the 9/11 terror-
ist attacks, all of the events were natural 
disasters. The majority of these catastrophes 
caused massive damage in the United States, 
with eighteen of the twenty-five occurring 
since 2001.
The rising costs of disasters in recent 
years are due primarily to the high concen-
tration of value at risk in increasingly urban-
ized, hazard-prone coastal areas, plus the 
relatively high degree of insurance penetra-
tion within the U.S. market, compared to less 
developed countries. 
As of the end of 2012, there was $35 
trillion of insured exposure in the coastal 
states from Texas to Maine. Almost half of 
this property value at risk was concentrated 
in three states subject to hurricanes and 
flooding: New York ($7 trillion), Texas ($5.4 
trillion), and Florida ($4.2 trillion). Consider 
Florida: its population increased from 2.8 
million in 1950 to 19.3 million in 2010— 
nearly 600%. Counties along the coast had 
$15 trillion of insured value at risk (see Fig-
 1  Michel-Kerjan, E. and H. Kunreuther (2012). “Paying for 
Future Catastrophes.” New York Times Sunday Review. 
November 24. 
 2  Siobhan H. (2013). Flood Insurance Prices Surge. Law 
Passed by Congress Before Sandy is Causing Sticker 
Shock—and a Backlash. Wall Street Journal, August 12. 
Pinter, N. (2013). The New Flood Insurance Disaster. New 
York Times. August 23. 
 3  Munich Re (2013). Topics geo. Natural catastrophes 
2012, Report, Munich: Munich Re.
 4  Aon Benfield (2013). Annual Global Climate and Catas-
trophe Report: 2012. Chicago, IL: Aon Benfield Impact 
Forecasting.
 5  Swiss Re (2011). sigma No 1/2011: Natural catastrophes 
and man-made disasters in 2010.
 6  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
(2011). “Special Report on Managing the Risks of Ex-
treme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change 
Adaptation (SREX)” http://ipcc-wg2.gov/SREX/report/
 7  Tebaldi, C., Strauss, B. H., & Zervas, C. E. (2012). “Mod-
elling Sea Level Rise Impacts on Storm Surges along US 
Coasts.” Environmental Research Letters, 7(1), 014032.
 8  Kunreuther, H., and E. Michel-Kerjan. (2011). At War with 
the Weather. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 9  ibid.
 10  Perry, C. A. (2000). “Significant Floods in the United 
States During the 20th Century—USGS Measures a Cen-
tury of Floods: USGS Fact Sheet 024–00”. Lawrence, 
table 1:  the 25 most costlY Insured catastrophes In the world, 1970-2012  
 $ bIllIon event vIctIms Year area oF
   (dead and  prImarY damage 
   mIssIng)
 76.3* Hurricane Katrina; floods 1,836 2005 USA, Gulf of Mexico
 39 9/11 terrorist attacks 3,025 2001 USA
 35.7 Earthquake (M 9.0) and tsunami 19,135 2011 Japan
 35.0* Hurricane Sandy; floods 237 2012 USA
 26.2 Hurricane Andrew 43 1992 USA, Bahamas
 21.7 Northridge Earthquake (M 6.6) 61 1994 USA
 21.6 Hurricane Ike; floods 136 2008 USA, Caribbean
 15.7 Hurricane Ivan 124 2004 USA, Caribbean
 15.3 Floods; heavy monsoon rains 815 2011 Thailand
 15.3 Earthquake (M 6.3); aftershocks 181 2011 New Zealand
 14.7 Hurricane Wilma; floods 35 2005 USA, Gulf of Mexico
 11.9 Hurricane Rita 34 2005 USA, Gulf of Mexico, et al.
 11.0 Drought in the Corn Belt 123 2012 USA
 9.8 Hurricane Charley 24 2004 USA, Caribbean, et al.
 9.5 Typhoon Mireille 51 1991 Japan
 8.5 Hurricane Hugo 71 1989 Puerto Rico, USA, et al.
 8.4 Earthquake (M 8.8); tsunami 562 2010 Chile
 8.2 Winter Storm Daria 95 1990 France, UK, et al.
 8.0 Winter Storm Lothar 110 1999 France, Switzerland, et al.
 7.4 Storms; over 350 tornadoes 350 2011 USA (Albama et al)
 7.2 Major tornado outbreak 155 2011 USA (Missouri et al)
 6.7 Winter Storm Kyrill 54 2007 Germany, UK, NL, France
 6.2 Storms and floods 22 1987 France, UK, et al.
 6.2 Hurricane Frances 38 2004 USA, Bahamas
 6.0 Hurricane Irene 55 2011 USA, Caribbean
   
*Including payment by the U.S. National Flood Insurance Program.
Sources: Authors’ calculation. Data from Swiss Re and Insurance Information Institute (in 2012 prices). Note: Years from 2001-2012 are in bold.
ure 1). If appropriate adaptation measures are 
not adopted in these areas, future hurricanes 
and floods are likely to replace Katrina and 
Sandy in the rankings of the most costly 
insured losses in the coming years.
Impact oF clImate change 
There have also been numerous scientific 
debates as to whether the series of hurri-
canes that occurred in 2004, 2005, 2008, and 
then again in 2011 and 2012 might be par-
tially attributable to the impact of a change 
in climate. One of the expected effects of 
global warming is an increase in hurricane 
intensity, storm surge and heavy precipita-
tion. This increase has been predicted by 
theory and modeling, and substantiated by 
empirical data. Higher ocean temperatures 
lead to an exponentially higher evaporation 
rate in the atmosphere, which increases the 
intensity of cyclones and precipitation.6 An 
increase in the number of major hurricanes 
over a shorter period of time is likely to 
translate into a greater number hitting the 
coasts, with a greater likelihood of damage 
to residences, commercial and industrial 
buildings, and public infrastructure—a trend 
that raises issues about the insurability of 
weather-related catastrophes.
Climate scientists are in general agree-
ment that global warming will increase sea 
level rise (SLR). A recent study analyzed 
55 nationally distributed tidal gauges across 
the United States and developed SLR 
projections at each gauge location. The data 
indicate that sea level will rise by a foot by 
2050 in most of these locations.7 High water 
levels that have a 1 in 100 chance of occur-
ring in 2013 will be ten times more likely 
to occur in 2050—that is, with a 1 in 10 
chance. This is only 37 years away, so it raises 
a concern not only for ourselves, but for our 
children and grandchildren. 
One need not look even that far into 
the future to see potentially grave losses 
looming. It may be surprising to learn that 
the probability is 1 in 6 that at least $10 bil-
lion of insured property will be destroyed by 
hurricanes somewhere in Florida next year.8 
This is equivalent to the chance of getting 
the number 3 in one toss of a die-hardly a 
low probability. 
If we extend the time horizon from one 
year to 10 years while keeping the popula-
tion of Florida constant, the likelihood of at 
least one hurricane causing damage exceed-
ing this amount is greater than 5 in 6—the 
much higher probability of not getting the 
number 3 in one toss of a die. With eco-
nomic development in coastal areas of this 
state and the apparent increased intensity 
of hurricanes, we are almost certain to 
experience a disaster of losses exceeding $10 
billion in Florida in the next decade.9 
Conventional wisdom holds that major 
accidents and disasters are low-probability 
events. We often think, “It’s not going to 
happen to us.” But when you are the Gover-
nor of a state or a Congressional legislator, 
there is ample reason to worry that such 
events actually have a relatively high likeli-
hood of occurring in an area over which you 
have responsibility.
a Focus on Flood hazard 
and the natIonal Flood 
Insurance program
In the United States, floods have been 
responsible for the largest number of lives 
lost and the most damage over the last 
century when compared with other natural 
disasters.10 Over the period 1960-2010, 
they accounted for nearly two-thirds of 
presidential disaster declarations.11 Given 
the projections of sea level rise from climate 
change, one can expect a more pronounced 
increase in flood losses in the coming years, 
unless steps are taken now to adapt to this 
changing environment. 
Floods are also the one natural disaster 
where the federal government currently 
plays a major role in designing and imple-
menting strategies for reducing future losses 
and aiding financial recovery through the 
Kansas, U.S. Geological Society;
 11  Michel-Kerjan, E. and H. Kunreuther (2011). “Reforming 
Flood Insurance.” Science 333, July 22.
 12  Michel-Kerjan, E. (2010). “Catastrophe Economics: The 
U.S. National Flood Insurance Program.” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 24(4): 165–86; Michel-Kerjan, E. 
and H. Kunreuther (2011). “Reforming Flood Insurance.” 
Science 333, July 22.
 13  There is a small private insurance market for residential 
insurance but traditionally above the $250,000 limit of 
the NFIP or forceplaced policies. The private insurance 
industry provides flood insurance to large commercial 
firms.
 14  Tobin, R. and C. Calfee (2005). “The National Flood Insur-
ance Program’s Mandatory Purchase Requirement: Poli-
cies, Processes, and Stakeholders.” American Institutes 
for Research, Washington, DC.
 15  Bayot J. (2005). “Payouts hinge on the cause of damage. 
“ New York Times, August 31.
 16  City of New York. (2013). A Stronger, More Resilient New 
York. New York City, PlaNYC. Quote taken from Chapter 
5, p. 97.
 17  Michel-Kerjan, Erwann, Sabine Lemoyne de Forges, and 
Howard Kunreuther (2012). Policy Tenure under the U.S. 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). Risk Analysis, 
32(4): 644-658.
 18  Data of Table 2 (except for Sandy) come from Michel-
Kerjan, E. and J. Volkman-Wise (2012),.“The Risk of 
FIgure 1:  Insured propertY values In coastal states
delaware: $249bn
rhode Island: $321bn
new hampshire $367bn
maine $368bn
mississippi $527bn
south carolina $915bn
alabama $1,014bn
louisiana: $1,018bn
connecticut: $1,152bn
maryland: $1,419bn
virginia: $1,867bn
north carolina: $1,894bn
massachusetts: $2.1 trillion
georgia: $2.2 trillion
new jersey $2.8 trillion
Florida: $4.2 trillion
texas: $5.4 trillion
new York: $7 trillion
Source: Data from Clark and Co. 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). 
The lessons for managing the flood risk 
discussed here thus offer guidelines for the 
roles that key interested parties can play with 
respect to preparedness and financing for 
not only natural disasters (floods, hurricanes, 
tornados, hail, earthquakes, droughts), but 
also other extreme events (terrorism, pan-
demics, technological catastrophes, financial 
crises). 
In July 2012 the President signed the 
National Flood Insurance Reform Act 
(NFIRA)—a significant piece of legislation 
designed to provide more accurate informa-
tion on the nature of flood risk by improv-
ing the quality of publically available flood 
maps across the nation. It also phases in 
risk-based premiums for policyholders with 
second homes or homes subject to repetitive 
flooding. The transition period is 5 years for 
homeowners currently benefiting from sub-
sidized flood insurance rates. The change in 
premiums is scheduled to begin this month 
but there are activities in Congress designed 
to delay its implementation for one year, due 
to concerns that residents may not be able 
to afford the risk-based premiums. But as 
we know from past history: Nothing is more 
permanent than the temporary.
The Wharton Risk Center has done 
a considerable amount of spadework with 
Congressional staffers on both sides of the 
aisle and the Obama Administration prior to 
the passage of NFIRA.12 We continue to do 
so today. 
In the concluding section we propose 
concrete ways to address the affordability 
issue that is now at the center of a national 
debate so the reform can be implemented as 
planned and insurance can play its appro-
priate role: signaling the flood risk that 
residents face through risk-based premiums 
and providing extended financial protection 
to those at risk. Risk-based pricing will also 
reward homeowners who undertake mitiga-
tion measures by reducing their premiums 
to reflect their lower expected damage, and 
hence lower expected claims payments, from 
future disasters. By contrast, if insurance 
remains highly subsidized, then there is no 
economic rationale for the NFIP to reduce 
premiums if a homeowner undertakes loss 
reduction measures. 
To appreciate the nature of our proposal, 
it is useful to briefly describe the current 
structure of the NFIP. This federal program 
was created in 1968 in response to a series 
of devastating floods in the 1950s and 
1960s that triggered significant government 
disaster assistance because private insurers 
were not providing coverage for water-
related damage to homes and small busi-
nesses. The program, managed by the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 
is designed as a partnership between the 
federal government and local communi-
ties. More specifically, communities can 
voluntarily join the program by adopting a 
floodplain ordinance that requires any new 
development and substantially improved 
or reconstructed properties to be built at or 
above the level of the 100-year flood (i.e., 
a flood with a 1% annual chance of occur-
rence). Only then can residents and small 
businesses purchase flood insurance. Today, 
20,000 communities participate; the program 
provides coverage for 5.3 million policies 
representing $1.3 trillion of insured exposure 
to flooding across the nation. Insurance 
tends to be concentrated in coastal states, 
with Florida and Texas alone comprising 
nearly 40% of the entire program (in number 
of policies, premiums and coverage). 
Currently, single-family residences 
can purchase up to $250,000 of building 
coverage and up to $100,000 of contents 
coverage. Businesses can purchase up to 
$500,000 each of building and contents 
coverage.13 Prices for these policies vary by 
flood risk zone as defined on flood insur-
ance rate maps (FIRMs) issued by FEMA, 
and by characteristics of the building (e.g., 
year of construction, elevation). In Special 
Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs), where the 
annual risk of a flood is 1 in 100 or greater, 
homeowners with a mortgage from a feder-
ally backed or regulated lender are required 
to purchase flood insurance for the life of the 
loan. But there are several problems with the 
current system.
1. ComplianCe 
Several data sources suggest that many peo-
ple do not voluntarily purchase flood insur-
ance even though they are exposed to flood 
risk. Consider the flood in August 1998 that 
damaged property in northern Vermont. Of 
the 1,549 victims of this disaster, FEMA 
found that 84 percent of the homeowners 
in flood-prone areas did not have insurance, 
even though 45 percent of these individuals 
were required to purchase this coverage.14 In 
the Louisiana parishes affected by Katrina, 
the percentage of homeowners with flood 
insurance when the hurricane hit ranged 
from 57.7 percent in St. Bernard Parish to 
7.3 percent in Tangipahoa Parish. Only 40 
percent of the residents in Orleans Parish 
had flood insurance.15
As pointed out in Mayor Bloomberg’s 
report following Hurricane Sandy: 
New York City estimates that less than 
20 percent of residential buildings in areas 
inundated by Sandy had coverage through the 
NFIP. The numbers are believed to have been 
even lower for business; approximately 26,400 
businesses with fewer than 50 employees were 
in the Sandy inundation zone in New York, but 
only 1,400 commercial NFIP policies were in 
effect when Sandy hit. 16 
Moreover, an in-depth analysis of the 
entire portfolio of the NFIP reveals that the 
median tenure of flood insurance is between 
two and four years, while the average length 
of time in a residence is seven years. Many 
people purchase coverage when they buy a 
house but let the insurance lapse after only 
a few years.17 This behavior occurs even 
when homeowners are required to purchase 
flood insurance as a condition for a federally 
insured mortgage. Some banks and financial 
institutions have not enforced this regula-
tion for at least two reasons: few of them 
have been fined and/or the mortgages are 
Ever-Growing Disaster Relief Expectations.” Mimeo, The 
Wharton School.  
 19  Kunreuther, H. (1968). “The Case for Comprehensive Di-
saster Insurance.” Journal of Law and Economics 11(1): 
133–163. 
 20  Hayes, T.L., and D.A. Neal. (2011). Actuarial Rate 
Review: In Support of the Recommended October 1, 
2011, Rate and Rule Changes. Washington, DC: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency.
 21  Congressional Budget Office (CBO). (2009). The National 
Flood Insurance Program: Factors Affecting Actuarial 
Soundness. Washington, DC.
 22  King, R. (2010) Mandatory Flood Insurance Purchase in 
Remapped Residual Risk Areas Behind Levees. Con-
gressional Research Service, 7-5700.
 23  Hayes, T.L., and D.A. Neal. (2011). Actuarial Rate 
Review: In Support of the Recommended October 1, 
2011, Rate and Rule Changes. Washington, DC: Federal 
Emergency Management Agency.
 24  These principles are discussed in more detail in Kun-
reuther, H., and E. Michel-Kerjan. (2011). At War with the 
Weather. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, and Kunreuther, 
H., M.V. Pauly, and S. McMorrow. (2013). Insurance and 
Behavioral Economics: Improving Decisions in the Most 
Misunderstood Industry. New York: Cambridge University 
Press.
 25  Government Accountability Office (GAO). (2013). Flood 
Insurance: More Information Needed on Subsidized 
Properties. Washington, DC: United States Government 
Accountability Office.
 26  Kunreuther, H. and E. Michel-Kerjan (2013). “Demand 
for Multi-Year Insurance: Evidence from Experiments.” 
Memo, Center for Risk Management, The Wharton 
School. 
 27  For more details on the above example of a family 
elevating its home and the financial implications to the 
homeowner and the federal government see Resources 
for the Future/Wharton Risk Center 2013. Addressing 
Affordability in the National Flood Insurance Program. 
RFF-13-12, August.
transferred to financial institutions on the 
secondary market in non-flood prone regions 
of the country that have not focused on 
either the flood hazard risk or the require-
ment that homeowners may have to purchase 
this coverage.
2. Disaster relief  
Table 2 shows the pronounced role of the 
federal government in assisting disaster 
victims and state governments of affected 
areas by examining several major disasters 
occurring in the past 60 years.18 In the case 
of Hurricane Sandy, the federal government 
provided $50 billion in emergency funds and 
another $10 billion to the NFIP so it could 
pay all its claims. 
This radical increase in government 
funding is likely to set precedents and 
expectations of more funding to come in the 
future. This creates economic disincentives 
for hazard-prone areas to reduce their own 
exposure and/or purchase proper insur-
ance coverage. It illustrates the Samaritan’s 
dilemma: by providing a large amount of 
funding, the government actually increases 
future spending, since communities assume 
that they will be bailed out after a disaster 
and therefore decide to encourage develop-
ment in high-risk areas and not purchase 
insurance. 
The general public appears to know 
very little as to how much they actually will 
receive in the way of disaster assistance if 
their house is damaged or destroyed by a 
natural disaster. The reality is that govern-
mental disaster relief is usually earmarked to 
rebuild destroyed infrastructure, not as direct 
aid to the victims. For example, as of 2013 
the maximum amount that individuals can 
obtain as a grant from FEMA’s Individual 
Assistance (IA) program to cover home 
repairs or damage to personal property is 
$31,900. Even if some people know this, 
they are likely to be unaware that the aver-
age grant for repair of a damaged home is 
only around $4,000.
3. premium DisCounts 
Among those who do obtain and main-
tain flood insurance, premium discounts 
are given for any structure in place before 
FEMA had produced flood insurance rate 
maps (FIRMs) of the area. The discounted 
premiums given to these pre-FIRM proper-
ties were designed to encourage greater 
participation in the program by both com-
munities and individuals, and not penalize 
homeowners who would otherwise see a 
sudden drop in their property values. These 
discounts were not means-tested and not 
targeted at lower-income households.19 
FEMA estimates that roughly 20 percent of 
flood insurance policies nationwide receive 
premium discounts, paying roughly 40–45 
percent of the full-risk price, although their 
subsidized premiums are often higher than 
those structures adhering to building codes 
because they reflect significantly greater 
risks.20 
4. repetitive losses 
As of 2009, there were 71,000 insured 
“repetitive loss properties,” representing 
only 1.2 percent of the NFIP portfolio but 
accounting for 16 percent of total claim 
payments between 1978 and 2008.21 About 
one in ten of these repetitive loss properties 
have received cumulative flood insurance 
reimbursements that have exceeded the 
value of the house.22 
5. insolvenCy 
While the NFIP aims to achieve financial 
soundness, there has been an understand-
ing since its inception that there might still 
be extreme events for which the program 
would have to borrow money from the U.S. 
Treasury to pay its claims. This occurred in 
the 1980s and the money was paid back to 
the Treasury. But then truly catastrophic 
flood-related losses occurred during the 
2005, 2008 and 2012 hurricane seasons. In 
fact, Hurricane Katrina and other flood-
related losses in 2005 led the NFIP to pay 
out more claims than it had over the entire 
life of the program up to that point,23 and 
the NFIP borrowing authority had to be 
increased to $20.775 billion. While some of 
this debt has been repaid, the NFIP had to 
borrow another $10 billion to pay its claims 
due to Hurricane Sandy. As of July 2013, 
this debt stood at $24 billion. Given that 
the program currently collects only $3.5 bil-
lion in premiums a year, repaying this debt 
is an issue. 
enhancIng resIlIence 
through Flood Insurance 
Hurricane Katrina, and Hurricane Ike in 
2008, spurred a national debate about how 
the NFIP could be reformed by being made 
financially sound, incentivizing personal 
responsibility and better addressing equity 
issues. The debate lasted for several years 
and in July 2012 the President signed the 
National Flood Insurance Reform Act 
(NFIRA) with overwhelming bipartisan 
support from Congress, extending the NFIP 
for five years until September 2017.
guIdIng prIncIples For 
Insurance
NFIRA takes steps to address the recent 
financial problems faced by the NFIP 
while making those in flood-prone areas 
more aware of the risks they face and more 
accountable for the water-related damage 
they may suffer from flood and hurricane 
table 2:  role oF Federal government 
In dIsaster loss paYment
 dIsaster Federal contrIbutIon 
  to total loss paYment
hurricane sandy (2012) >80%
hurricane Ike (2008) 69%
hurricane Katrina (2005) 50%
hurricane hugo (1989) 23%
hurricane diane (1955) 6%
  
disasters. The legislation embodies the fol-
lowing two guiding principles that a group 
of us have proposed so as to make insurance 
a more meaningful policy tool for reducing 
future losses.24
PrinciPle 1: Flood insurance 
Premiums should reFlect risk  
Insurance premiums should reflect risk to 
signal to individuals how safe or exposed 
they are, and the extent to which preven-
tive or protective measures will reduce their 
vulnerability to property losses. Risk-based 
premiums should also reflect the cost of 
capital that insurers need to integrate into 
their pricing to assure adequate competitive 
returns to their investors.
Principle 1 provides a clear signal of the 
risk to those currently residing in areas sub-
ject to natural disasters and those consider-
ing moving into these regions. As men-
tioned before, if premiums are risk-based 
then homeowners and businesses investing 
in cost-effective loss-reduction measures will 
benefit by having the price of their coverage 
reduced because of lower expected losses 
and hence lower claims in the future, thus 
providing them with an economic incentive 
to implement those measures. 
If Principle 1 is applied in hazard-prone 
areas where premiums are currently subsi-
dized, however, some residents will now be 
faced with large price increases. This concern 
leads to the second guiding principle.
PrinciPle 2: equity and 
aFFordability needs to be 
considered  
In dealing with equity and affordability 
issues, any special financial assistance given 
to consumers currently residing in hazard-
prone areas should come from means-tested, 
tax-financed insurance vouchers and not 
through cross-subsidized insurance premi-
ums for all buyers.
Principle 2 is important because some 
individuals residing in hazard-prone areas 
will find that their premiums will increase 
considerably when they reflect their true 
exposure to flood risk and will impose 
an unexpected financial burden. For this 
reason we have proposed that a national 
means-tested insurance voucher program be 
established so as to make risk-based rates 
equitable to this subset of individuals. Note 
that Principle 2 applies only to those lower 
wealth individuals who currently reside in 
hazard-prone areas. Those who decide to 
move to the area should be aware that they 
will be charged premiums that reflect the risk.
Features oF nFIra 
NFIRA addresses the above two principles 
by authorizing more accurate risk assess-
ments of the flood hazard and focusing on 
risk-based premiums, while recognizing that 
affordability issues need to be addressed. Yet 
challenges remain in implementing the new 
flood insurance legislation. 
imProved risk maPs  
FEMA is now developing more accurate 
flood maps to set risk-based rates, with $400 
million per year authorized by NFIRA for 
this purpose over fiscal years 2013–2017. 
Prior to Hurricane Sandy, FEMA was 
restudying areas of the New Jersey and New 
York coastlines so as to update flood insur-
ance rate maps (FIRMs). Because existing 
FIRMs for these areas were developed more 
than 25 years ago, and updated FIRMs are 
not finalized, FEMA determined that it 
is vital to provide near-term advisory base 
flood elevations to support reconstruction 
efforts. Home and business owners suffering 
damage from Hurricane Sandy in com-
munities adopting these advisory base flood 
elevations will be required to build higher 
and safer structures. This also means lower 
flood insurance premiums to these proper-
ties due to the reduced risk of water damage 
from future hurricanes.
risk-based Premiums  
Under NFIRA, flood insurance premiums 
will be increased 25 percent per year until 
prices reflect FEMA’s best estimate of the 
flood risk for non-primary residences, severe 
repetitive loss properties, and business 
properties. In addition, discounted rates will 
be eliminated for single-family households 
when a policy lapses, a property is sold, the 
property sustains substantial flood damage 
(defined as damage greater than 50% of the 
home’s value), the property is substantially 
improved, or a new policy is purchased. The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
estimates that roughly 438,000 policies 
nationwide will see higher rates immedi-
ately; 715,000 policies will have their pre-
miums remain at the current level until one 
of the triggers is met.25 Starting in October 
2014, routine rate revisions will also include 
a 5% assessment to help the program build a 
catastrophic reserve fund. 
The legislation also calls for the phas-
ing out of grandfathering, a practice that 
enabled homeowners to keep their old 
premiums when a new map reclassified them 
into a higher-risk zone. Going forward, new 
rates will be phased in by increasing premi-
ums 20 percent per year until the risk-based 
price is reached for properties mapped into a 
higher-risk zone. 
aFFordability issues
NFIRA authorized studies by FEMA 
and the National Academy of Sciences to 
examine ways of incorporating risk-based 
premiums (Principle 1) and the feasibility of 
means-tested insurance vouchers (Principle 
2). But the studies have not yet started, and 
in the meantime, the implementation of 
NFIRA is now facing serious challenges. 
While there is general agreement that risk-
based premiums provide a sound foundation 
for an insurance program, many residents in 
flood-prone areas who will likely see their 
premiums increase significantly are request-
ing that their Senators and Representatives 
maintain the current rates. In fact, afford-
ability concerns have already led Congress 
to consider proposals to delay or revise this 
part of the legislation. We feel this is a step 
backwards. As detailed below, we believe it 
is essential to implement NFIRA so as to 
better incentivize consumers to purchase 
insurance, while also making this insurance 
more affordable for lower-income individu-
als currently residing in areas with high 
flood risk.
reducIng losses and 
addressIng aFFordabIlItY 
bY modIFYIng nFIra
NFIRA provides a foundation for address-
ing the two questions posed at the beginning 
of this Issue Brief: How do we encourage 
investment in loss reduction measures, and 
who should pay the costs of preparing for 
and recovering from disasters? For insurance 
to play a central role in reducing losses and 
aiding recovery we propose that NFIRA 
incorporate the following features: 
requIrIng Flood Insurance and 
ensurIng the requIrement Is 
enForced
Given the large number of uninsured 
individuals in flood-prone areas and the 
tendency for homeowners to cancel their 
policies after several years, flood insurance 
should be tied to the property rather than 
to the homeowner. Doing so would also 
ensure that exposed properties are covered 
over time. Insurance should be required of 
all residences in flood-prone areas for the 
same reason that automobile insurance is 
required in all states today: having cover-
age provides financial protection in the case 
of a loss. Should the homeowner move to 
another location, the flood insurance policy 
would remain with the property. One way 
to accomplish this would be to introduce 
multi-year flood insurance into the current 
menu of insurance contracts, with premiums 
on the flood insurance policy fixed for a pre-
specified time period (for example, 5 years). 
Recent research shows that there would be a 
significant demand for such contracts.26 
rIsK-based premIums and 
means-tested Insurance 
vouchers
As stated above, flood insurance premiums 
should reflect risk based on updated flood 
maps. To deal with equity and affordability 
issues, homeowners currently residing in 
flood-prone areas whose premiums would 
increase should be given a means-tested 
insurance voucher to reflect the difference 
between the current discounted premium 
and the risk-based premium. This type of 
in-kind assistance ensures that the recipients 
use the funds for obtaining insurance rather 
than having the freedom to spend the money 
on goods and services of their own choosing. 
The amount of the insurance voucher would 
be determined by the family’s income, other 
socio-demographic information (e.g. number 
of children living at home) and the magni-
tude of the increase in the insurance pre-
mium. Several existing programs could serve 
as models for developing such a national 
voucher program: the Food Stamp Program, 
the Low Income Home Energy Assistance 
Program (LIHEAP) and Universal Service 
Fund (USF). 
Although a voucher can be justified on 
equity grounds and can serve as a basis for 
risk-based premiums, there still may be resis-
tance to this concept by real estate developers 
and builders and upper-income households. 
Congress also needs to decide how large the 
voucher should be and the appropriate way 
to fund it.
long-term mItIgatIon loans 
We propose also to couple means-tested 
vouchers with required hazard mitigation 
(risk reduction), financed with low-interest 
loans. By requiring hazard mitigation, 
future disaster losses would be reduced 
both for the NFIP and for families. The 
proposed voucher program has two key 
features. First, it is based on risk-based 
insurance premiums, which are essential for 
communicating information about flood 
risk. Second, the vouchers not only cover a 
portion of the insurance premium, but also 
the costs of the loan to reduce future dam-
age to the residence. 
By spreading the upfront costs of a 
loss reduction measure over time through 
a home improvement loan, residents in 
flood-prone areas would have an economic 
incentive to mitigate the risk of future flood 
damages. Suppose a family was offered a 
20-year loan at 3 percent to elevate their 
home four feet at a cost of $25,000. If they 
undertook this measure, their risk-based 
annual flood insurance premium would be 
reduced from $4,000 to $520. If the family 
takes the loan, the annual payment would 
be $1,680. From a financial viewpoint, 
this package should be attractive, since the 
reduction in the annual insurance premium 
of $3,480 is much greater than the cost of 
the loan. An innovation would be to market 
the flood insurance and the home improve-
ment loan as a package tied to the property 
so the net benefits from undertaking the 
mitigation measure would be obvious to the 
homeowner.
One could link issues of affordability 
to loss reduction in the following way. As a 
condition for receiving an insurance voucher, 
the homeowner would be required to invest 
in a cost-effective loss reduction measure. 
Those homeowners agreeing to do so would 
also receive a means-tested loan in addition 
to the insurance premium voucher so they 
can afford to make their home more resis-
tant to water-related damages from floods 
and hurricanes. A combination voucher and 
 “If appropriate adaptation 
measures are not adopted, 
future hurricanes and floods 
are likely to replace Katrina 
and Sandy in the rankings of 
the most costly insured losses 
in the coming years.”
loan program can save homeowners money 
by lowering their flood insurance premiums. 
This program also would allow the NFIP to 
lower its exposure through loss reduction 
measures and would improve its financial 
soundness through risk-based pricing. 27
Our recommendations offer a policy 
solution whereby individuals would reduce 
their flood risk and become financially 
protected against future disaster losses, thus 
reducing the need for taxpayer money for 
disaster relief in the future. This is a win-win 
situation that should be attractive to legisla-
tors on both sides of the aisle.
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brief in brief
•	 The	United	States	has	entered	a	new	era	of	
catastrophes, of which floods have been the 
most devastating. 
•	 Through	its	2012	reform	(Biggert-Waters	Act),	
the 45-year old federally-run National Flood 
Insurance Program has an opportunity to 
highlight the role that risk-based premiums 
can play in encouraging individuals to under-
take loss reduction measures. 
•	 But	the	implementation	of	this	reform	is	
now being challenged due to concerns that 
residents cannot afford risk-based premiums. 
•	 We	propose	that	this	can	be	overcome	by	
successfully combining risk-based pricing, 
required insurance, means-tested insurance 
vouchers, and mitigation loans, so that 
individuals reduce their flood risk and are 
financially protected against future disaster 
losses, thus reducing the need for taxpayer 
money for disaster relief in the future.
